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Abstract
The effect of minority status on managerial survival in Major League Baseball
is analyzed using survival time analysis and data envelopment analysis. Efficiency
scores based on team performance and player salary data from 1985 to 2006 are
computed and included as covariates in a survival time analysis. It is shown that
when controlling for performance and personal characteristics minorities are on
average 9.6 percentage points more likely to return the following season. Addi-
tionally, it is shown that winning percentage has no impact on managerial survival
when efficiency is controlled for.
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Introduction
Due to the obsessively accurate and detailed record keeping of Major League 
Baseball and the popularity of the sport, there exists a large amount of literature on 
almost all aspects of the sport, including discrimination and managerial retention.  
However, previous research has failed to link the two subjects by including race as a 
factor when examining managerial retention in professional sports.  The analysis 
presented in this paper looks to fill this gap in the literature by providing a thorough 
analysis of the effects of minority status on managerial survival in Major League 
Baseball.  
On opening day of 2007 only six out of thirty Major League Baseball teams were 
lead by minority managers.  This represents only 20 percent of major league managers.
This low percentage of minority managers is very surprising given the great diversity of 
players in Major League Baseball.  Approximately 42 percent of major league players are 
black, Hispanic, or Asian.  One would expect a lower percentage of minority managers 
than players as many minority players do not possess the English speaking skills required 
to manage.  However, a difference this large certainly deserves investigation.  Even more 
surprising than this relatively low percentage of minority managers, is the fact that for the 
2007 season there was only one black manager in the major leagues.  This is the lowest 
number of black managers since Frank Robinson became the first black manager over 30 
years ago in 1975.  Not only is the number of black managers at an all time low, but the 
number of minority managers has decreased significantly in recent years.  From 2002 to 
2007, the percentage of minority managers in the major leagues was reduced significantly 
from its all-time high of 33 percent to 20 percent.
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This paper examines whether this recent downward trend in minority managers is 
the result of minorities having a lower probability of survival than white managers.  This
question is analyzed by applying survival time analysis and data envelopment analysis to 
data on major league managers from 1985 through 2006.  Through survival analysis, it 
can be established whether or not minority status has a negative impact on the likelihood 
of a manager returning for another season.
Previous Literature
The following studies are most directly related to survival analysis of major 
league managers.  Scully (1994) uses survival analysis to show that managerial retention
is influenced by managerial efficiency for the sports of baseball, basketball, and football.  
However, Scully (1994) does not include other covariates in addition to managerial 
efficiency.  I improve upon his survival analysis by including covariates for various 
characteristics including race. I also consider a wider range of underlying distributions 
for the survival analysis in this paper.  Scully (1994) uses a measurement of managerial 
efficiency which is based on a comparison of a manager’s actual winning percentage to 
an estimate of their maximum possible winning percentage.  These maximum winning 
percentages are estimated using ratios of a manager’s runs or points to his opponent’s 
runs or points.  The efficiency scores used in my analysis differ greatly from that of 
Scully (1994) as I use a data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach.  In this analysis
efficiencies measure a manager’s performance relative to the best performance possible 
with his team’s given talent as measured by player salaries.  Unlike Scully (1994), the 
efficiency measure presented here does not rely on team scoring statistics, which could be 
affected by the quality of management.  The DEA approach presented here is similar to 
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that of Einolf (2004).  However, I choose a different measure of output and include a 
negative input for the level of competition a team faces.
Fizel and D’Itri (1997) use probit estimation to study the impact of organizational 
performance on manager succession in 147 college basketball teams from 1984 to 1991.  
They use data envelopment analysis to measure managerial efficiency based on team 
talent and the strength of the opposition.  As with the other previous studies Fizel and 
D’Itri (1997) do not include race in their analysis.  They find that when winning 
percentage is included managerial efficiency does not have a significant impact.  Using 
survival time analysis instead of probit estimation I find the opposite to be true for Major 
League Baseball.  The advantage of survival time analysis over probit is that it allows the 
effect of the covariates to vary depending on the year of tenure being considered.  This is 
desirable in this context as there is no reason to assume the effects of race would be the 
same in a manager’s first year as in their tenth year.  
Survival analysis is used by Audas, Dobson, and Goddard (1999) to examine the 
effects of various performance and descriptive variables on the tenure of English soccer 
coaches using individual game data from 1972 to 1997.  While Audas et al. (1999) do
utilize the Cox proportional hazard model, which is the model of choice in this study, 
they also do not include race as a covariate.  Additionally, they use the team’s league 
standing when the manager started his tenure to capture differences in the talent available 
to the manager.  The data envelopment analysis presented in this study captures 
differences in talent through the use of player salaries.  This data envelopment analysis
measure is more appropriate for professional baseball as managers are not in charge of 
acquiring and exchanging players as they traditionally are in European soccer.  
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Variable Selection
For this analysis the dependent variable of interest is whether or not a manager 
returns for another season.  This analysis treats all terminations equally and does not 
differentiate between voluntary and involuntary terminations.  It is not uncommon in 
professional baseball for a manager to be allowed to resign from his job in order to save 
his reputation.  This makes distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary 
terminations extremely difficult.  Therefore, the dependent variable in this analysis is 
equal to zero for any season after which the manager returns to manage the same team 
and one for any season after which the manager does not return to coach the same team.  
Managers are included in the analysis so long as they managed more than five 
consecutive games in a given season.  The goal of this restriction is to eliminate those 
managers who were not actually being considered for retention, such as those filling in 
for an absent manager or during the transition to a new manager.   There is no specific 
number of games which signals a manager is being considered for retention but it is safe 
to say those managing less than six games are not being considered for retention.  Raising 
this restriction to 50 games would only eliminate 5 out of 87 minority observations and 
does not affect the conclusions of this analysis.  Therefore, the author chooses to only 
eliminate those who are most obviously not under consideration for retention without fear 
that this restriction is driving the results of the analysis.
The dependent variable or probability of returning in the next season is expected 
to be influenced by both the manager’s performance and by individual characteristics of 
the manager and team.  The first and most important job of a manager is to win games.  
Therefore, it is expected that some measure of team wins would have a significant 
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positive impact on the probability that a manager returns the following season.  The 
winning percentage for each team during the portion of the year that the manager was 
with that team is used to measure this ability to win.  Winning percentage is chosen over 
total wins as it makes comparisons between managing spells of different lengths possible. 
While regular season wins are important, the ultimate goal of a team is not to win 
regular season games but rather to win the World Series.  Therefore, playoff wins are also 
expected to influence managerial survival.  In order to measure a manager’s playoff 
success, wins in the League Championship Series and World Series are also included in 
the survival analysis.  Wins in the Division Series are not included in this analysis as the 
division series did not exist prior to the 1995 season.
While winning is the most important thing to baseball fans, owners must also 
consider profits.  Due to these financial restrictions some managers may be given less 
talent to work with than others.  When faced with one of these low budget rosters there is 
only so much a manager can do to make a team win.  If a team has more talent than other 
teams and still loses it is likely that people will look at the management as a source of the 
problem.  However, if a team with no talent loses it is unlikely that the manager will be 
blamed.  Therefore, a more appropriate measure of manager performance may be how 
efficiently the manager transforms his given resources into wins.  Efficiency scores for 
managers can be calculated using data envelopment analysis and then included in the 
survival analysis to control for managerial performance.  The specifics of the data 
envelopment analysis are discussed in the next section.
It is obvious that managerial survival is not completely based on wins and league 
standing.  In some cases the decision to retain or fire a manager may be based on personal 
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characteristics and qualifications.  One important characteristic is the experience of a 
manager.  It is expected that years spent in baseball as a coach or player will increase a 
manager’s baseball specific human capital and therefore make them a better coach.  Such
increases in on the field performance should be captured by the efficiency measure.  
However, experience may also improve skills not captured by the efficiency measure,
such as the ability to communicate with the press and interact with front office personnel.  
For this reason it is expected that experience as a manager should increase the likelihood 
of retention beyond its contribution to efficiency.  It is also expected that as experience 
increases its returns in terms of human capital may diminish as the probability of learning 
something new decreases with years spent around baseball.  In order to capture the 
effects of this human capital on the probability of survival, games as a manager at the 
Major League level are included in the analysis.  The square of this variable is also 
included to capture the expected diminishing effects.
Similarly to experience, one would expect that age also influences the probability 
of a manager returning for the next season.  The amount of information and experiences a 
manager has been exposed to in and out of baseball increases with age.  Any useful 
information or experience outside of managing games would not be captured by the 
experience variable.  This would lead one to expect a positive relationship between age 
and retention.  However, as age increases it is also more likely that a manager will choose 
to retire.  It may also be expected that as managers’ ages increase they are less able to 
relate to young players and will therefore be less effective.  This increased likelihood of 
retirement and inability to relate to young players leads to a negative relationship 
between age and retention.  To capture these effects and determine whether they are 
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positive or negative managers’ ages, in years, are calculated and included in the analysis.  
As with experience we would expect that the benefits of age would diminish with time
and the likelihood of retirement would increase with age and so the square of age is also 
included in the analysis.
The personal characteristic of interest in this analysis is the manager’s minority 
status.  A variable which is equal to one for Black and Hispanic managers and zero 
otherwise is included to capture this effect.  If minorities face discrimination in 
managerial retention decisions, one would expect to observe a negative relationship
between this variable and the probability of survival.
Measuring Efficiency with Data Envelopment Analysis
In order to evaluate how efficiently a manager turns his team’s potential into wins 
the method of data envelopment analysis can be applied.  This application differs little 
from the use of data envelopment analysis in productivity analysis of firms.  In 
productivity analysis firms take inputs and transform them into outputs.  These outputs 
are compared to a constructed production possibilities frontier in order to determine how 
efficient the firm is.  The analysis presented here is based on the output oriented technical 
efficiency method presented by Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984).
The production frontier is based on three assumptions about the production 
technology.  The first assumption is that inputs are freely disposable.  This means that if a 
certain level of inputs can produce some level of output, then a level of inputs which is 
greater in at least one dimension can also produce that level of output.  The second 
assumption is that output is freely disposable.  This implies that if a certain level of inputs 
can produce some level of output, then that same level of inputs can also produce any 
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lower level of output.  The third assumption is the convexity of the production 
possibilities set.  Convexity implies that any linear combination of two feasible points is 
also feasible.
This production frontier can be shown graphically for the one input one output 
case.  Given a set of observed points it is possible to show all points which are feasible.  
The convexity assumption means that all points which are linear combinations of the 
observed points are possible.  Graphically, this is shown by connecting the data points to 
create a convex hull.  The assumption of free disposability of inputs implies that all 
points to the right of the convex hull are feasible.  Similarly the assumption of free 
disposability of output implies that all points below a feasible point are possible.  When 
these assumptions are combined the result is a production possibility set as seen in the 
following figure.
DEA Production Possibilities Frontier
A
B
C
Input
O
ut
pu
t
In order to measure how efficiently a firm, or in this case manager, is producing,
their actual output can be compared to the maximum feasible output given that level of 
inputs.  This is referred to as the output oriented technical efficiency.  This measure of 
efficiency is most appropriate in this analysis as managers have limited ability to choose 
their inputs as building the team is the job of the general manager.  Therefore, the 
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question of interest is how much more could the manager have produced given his inputs 
rather than how much could inputs have been reduced given the managers output.  The 
technical efficiency is measured by the firms actual output divided by the maximum 
feasible output for that level of inputs.  In the above chart, for observation B, this is the 
distance from A to B divided by the distance from A to C.
In the case of baseball managers, the output of interest is wins.  However, due to 
the fact that not all managers manage an entire season and not all seasons have had the 
same number of games wins are not comparable from one observation to the next.  This 
problem is avoided by measuring output in terms of winning percentage.  For this data 
envelopment analysis playoff wins are not included as managers who are given teams of 
very low ability will likely not have the possibility of producing any playoff wins.  
Therefore, only regular season performance is included in this analysis.  However, 
playoff wins are included in the survival analysis presented in the next section.
While the output of interest seems very obvious and easy to calculate the inputs 
are much more difficult.  The inputs of interest are the players a manager is given.  More 
specifically the inputs are the amount of talent which a manager has to work with.  This 
talent can come in many forms, such as hitting, fielding, pitching, and speed.  These 
talents are traditionally measure through statistics such as batting average, earned run 
average, and runs scored.  However, in this context using measures of player performance 
is inappropriate.  This is due to the fact that a player’s individual performance over a 
season is likely to be influenced by the quality of the manager.  A good manager may 
cause a pitcher to have a lower ERA than a bad manager.  If input is measured in terms of 
ERA then the measure will always be overstating the level of input for good managers 
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and understating the level of input for bad managers.  Simply using performance statistics 
from prior seasons would not eliminate this problem for those players who have only 
played under one manager.  Additionally, past statistics would not exist for any players 
who are in their first season at the major league level. 
What is needed is a measure of player potential independent of the influence of 
the manager.  It is reasonable to assume that teams pay players based on how they expect 
them to perform.  This level of pay is determined before the player actually plays that 
season and therefore should not be influenced by the manager’s performance that season.  
Due to contracting issues, such as free agency, player salaries are not an exact measure of 
player potential.  However, they are the only measure of talent which is observable 
independent of managerial performance for all players.  Based on this logic player 
salaries are used as inputs to the production of winning percentage.  This means that the 
output oriented efficiency will measure how efficiently a manager produced wins given 
his set of player salaries.  This is precisely the measure of performance which is expected 
to determine whether a manager is retained for the next season.
Due to data limitations and for simplicity of analysis the salaries are divided into 
offensive salaries and defensive salaries.  For offense, the salaries of the players who 
played the greatest number of games at each infield position and the top three outfielders 
in games played are summed for each team of each year from 1985 to 2006.  Due to the 
presence of the designated hitter in the American League the analysis must be done 
separately for the National and American Leagues.  When calculating the efficiencies for 
the American League the designated hitter salary is also included as an offensive salary.  
For defense, the salaries of the top five pitchers in terms of games started and the top six 
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pitchers in terms of relief appearances are summed for each team of each year.  Player 
salaries are available for the years 1985 on from several online sources, including 
espn.com, usatoday.com, and the Sean Lahman Baseball Database.
While the potential of a team reflected in its salaries is an important input it is not 
the only constraint which a manager faces.  The level of talent on opposing teams will act 
as a negative input.  If two managers have identical teams and one plays against better 
competition, that manager cannot be expected to win as much.  Therefore, a negative 
input for the salary of the competition is included in the analysis.  Major League teams 
play the majority of their games against teams within their division.  Therefore, the 
negative input is calculated as the average total salary of the other teams in a given 
team’s division.  With this variable included, both measures of the potential a manager is 
given and the potential he is expected to compete against are taken into consideration.
As any baseball fan knows baseball salaries have grown rapidly over the past 
several decades.  Therefore, in order to compare inputs from different seasons the salaries 
must be adjusted for the rapid increase in the level of Major League salaries.  To 
accomplish this, a price index is created by calculating the average player salary for each 
season from 1985 to 2006 and dividing the 2006 average salary by that of the other 
seasons.  This index, presented below, is used to adjust all player salaries into 2006 
baseball dollars.
Baseball Salary Price Index
Year Multiple
1985 5.9531
1986 6.7943
1987 6.5175
1988 6.2569
1989 5.6078
1990 5.5383
1991 3.1781
1992 2.7059
1993 2.9013
1994 2.7006
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1995 2.9374
1996 2.7602
1997 2.3236
1998 2.2130
1999 1.9084
2000 1.4222
2001 1.2433
2002 1.1847
2003 1.1014
2004 1.1376
2005 1.0762
2006 1.0000
With the inputs and outputs defined the output oriented technical efficiency can 
be calculated.  This is done by solving the following maximization problem and taking 
the inverse of the resulting value of θ.  θ can be interpreted as the multiple by which 
output can be increased using a feasible combination of observed inputs.  The subscript 0 
identifies values for the team being analyzed.  The subscript i identifies the other teams in 
the comparison group.  W, O, D, and C represents winning percentage, offense, defense, 
and competition respectively.
Maximize θ
Subject to: (1) ∑λiWi ≥ θW0
(2) ∑λiOi ≤ O0
(3) ∑λiDi ≤ D0
(4) ∑λiCi ≥ C0
(5) ∑λi = 1
(6) λi ≥ 0
Constraint (1) implies that the combination of other observed winning percentages 
must be greater than or equal to the observed winning percentage of the manager being 
evaluated.  Constraints (2) and (3) imply that the combination of offensive and defensive 
inputs must be less than the inputs of the manager under consideration.  Equation (4) 
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states that the combination of the negative competition inputs must be at least as great as 
the competition faced by the manager being evaluated.  Constraint (5) implies variable 
returns to scale by eliminating scaled down versions of one input bundle from the 
feasibility set.  The last constraint simply assures that there are no negative inputs.
The fact that W0 is a feasible level of output assures that the maximum value of θ 
will be greater than 1.  Therefore, the technical efficiency, or percentage of feasible 
output which is being produced, is the inverse of θ.  Because θ is greater than 1 this 
number will always lie in the closed interval from 0 to 1.  For example, if a manager has 
an efficiency score of 0.8 his winning percentage is 80% of what could have been 
achieved by a linear combination of other observations which has the same or lesser
inputs.
The output oriented efficiency is calculated for each manager for each season 
from 1986 to 2005 for both the American and National Leagues.  In order to increase the 
number of comparison input output combinations, for each season each manager is 
evaluated compared to all managers in that year along with the previous and following 
seasons.  For example, for the Philadelphia Phillies in 2005 Charlie Manuel is evaluated 
relative to all National League managers from the years 2004, 2005, and 2006.  The 
inverse of the resulting θ from the maximization problem with Charlie Manuel’s 2005 
season as the evaluated observation is his technical efficiency for that year.  These 
efficiencies are calculated for each manager in the American and National League with 
more than five consecutive games managed for the years 1986 to 2005 and are used in the 
subsequent survival analysis.  A ranking of managers in terms of efficiency is listed in the 
following table.  The reported technical efficiencies are game weighted averages from the 
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years 1986 through 2005 for all managers with at least 200 games managed within the 
sample.
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Managers 1986-2005 (Minimum 200 Games)
Rank Manager
Games in 
Sample
Average 
TE Rank Manager
Games in 
Sample
Average 
TE
1 Ron Gardenhire 647 1.0000 43 John Wathan 646 0.8567
2 John Boles 446 0.9996 44 Jimy Williams 1701 0.8564
3 Bobby Cox 2460 0.9868 45 Tom Kelly 2386 0.8540
4 Ken Macha 486 0.9689 46 Buck Showalter 1554 0.8534
5 Ned Yost 485 0.9666 47 Ray Knight 261 0.8512
6 Jack McKeon 1356 0.9516 48 Jim Lefebvre 859 0.8507
7 Bruce Bochy 1764 0.9462 49 Hal McRae 872 0.8496
8 Larry Dierker 810 0.9390 50 Johnny Oates 1544 0.8490
9 Eric Wedge 486 0.9372 51 Charlie Manuel 573 0.8489
10 Jim Leyland 2202 0.9354 52 Doc Edwards 380 0.8486
11 Felipe Alou 1893 0.9310 53 Joe Morgan 563 0.8474
12 Don Zimmer 524 0.9289 54 Buddy Bell 919 0.8443
13 Bob Brenly 565 0.9283 55 Davey Johnson 1027 0.8418
14 Marcel Lachemann 331 0.9269 56 Cito Gaston 1319 0.8411
15 Art Howe 2266 0.9258 57 Jeff Torborg 994 0.8398
16 Dick Williams 351 0.9199 58 Greg Riddoch 394 0.8366
17 Frank Robinson 1164 0.9166 59 Doug Rader 448 0.8338
18 Pete Rose 236 0.9131 60 Larry Bowa 853 0.8297
19 Mike Scioscia 972 0.9029 61 Lloyd McClendon 782 0.8122
20 Terry Francona 972 0.8985 62 Davey Lopes 340 0.8057
21 Lou Piniella 2939 0.8975 63 Bob Melvin 486 0.8054
22 Gene Lamont 1115 0.8968 64 Rene Lachemann 506 0.8044
23 Larry Rothschild 499 0.8956 65 Carlos Tosca 382 0.8023
24 Dusty Baker 2042 0.8937 66 Tony Muser 748 0.7994
25 Joe Torre 2324 0.8935 67 Terry Bevington 437 0.7914
26 Buck Rodgers 313 0.8934 68 Butch Hobson 439 0.7887
27 Tony LaRussa 3090 0.8920 69 Clint Hurdle 626 0.7845
28 Grady Little 324 0.8869 70 Dave Miley 289 0.7803
29 Jerry Manuel 971 0.8864 71 Buck Martinez 215 0.7780
30 Bill Russell 322 0.8857 72 Nick Leyva 338 0.7746
31 Bud Harrelson 274 0.8844 73 Jim Riggleman 1085 0.7722
32 Kevin Kennedy 582 0.8830 74 John McNamara 267 0.7587
33 Bobby Valentine 1003 0.8826 75 Dallas Green 633 0.7584
34 Tom Trebelhorn 932 0.8713 76 Tony Pena 483 0.7497
35 Hal Lanier 486 0.8687 77 Alan Trammell 486 0.7446
36 Mike Hargrove 2123 0.8671 78 Gene Michael 238 0.7420
37 Don Baylor 1317 0.8666 79 Russ Nixon 347 0.7222
38 Terry Collins 907 0.8622 80 Lee Elia 254 0.7200
39 Phil Garner 1748 0.8616 81 Jerry Narron 389 0.7177
40 Jim Tracy 810 0.8613 82 Ray Miller 324 0.7027
41 Bob Boone 815 0.8605 83 Stump Merrill 275 0.6905
42 Jim Fregosi 1637 0.8585 84 Chuck Tanner 361 0.6622
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Survival Analysis
The goal of this paper is to determine whether race has a significant impact on the 
probability of a manager surviving to the next season.  This can be accomplished through 
the use of survival time analysis.  Survival time analysis examines the relationship 
between the time to an event and several characteristics, referred to as covariates.  The 
goal of survival analysis is to estimate a survival function which gives the probability of 
survival to a certain time period given a set of covariates.  These covariates can be 
constant over time, such as minority status, or varying each period, such as winning 
percentage.
Survival time analysis can be done by making distributional assumptions about 
the survival function.  Models which use this method are referred to as parametric 
models.  The first step to estimating such models is to estimate the hazard rate as a 
function of the covariates.  The hazard rate is simply the drop out rate in a given time 
period conditional on a set of covariates.  This rate is always positive so the model is 
assumed to be linear in the log of the hazard rate.  Therefore, the model of interest is the 
following.
log(hi) = B0 + B1Xi1 + B2Xi2 + … + BnXin
As can be seen this model does not depend on time.  Therefore, it assumes that the 
hazard rate is constant over time.  This leads to a survival function of the following form.
S(t) = e-ht
This model is referred to as the exponential survival model and is the most simplistic of 
the commonly used models due to its assumption of a constant hazard rate over time.
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The assumption that the hazard rate is constant over time is often inappropriate 
and therefore models which allow for the hazard rate to vary over time may be more 
appropriate.  The most common parametric forms of these models are the Weibull and 
Gompertz models.  These models assume that there is some underlying hazard rate which 
is dependent on time.  It is also assumed that there is no interaction between time and the 
covariates.  The covariates effect the hazard rate by proportionally changing the 
underlying rate for a given time period.  This is why these models are referred to as 
parametric proportional hazards models.  Mathematically the hazard rate is modeled as 
follows.
h(t) = h0(t)exp(B0 + B1Xi1 + B2Xi2 + … + BnXin)
Different functional forms of h0(t) will lead to different survival functions.  The 
underlying hazard rate is commonly assumed to have a Weibull distribution.  This leads 
to the following form for the survival function.  
S(t) = e-(ht)p
This is desirable as the hazard rate will be either increasing or decreasing monotonically 
with time depending on the value of the estimated parameter p.  If p is greater than 1 the 
hazard rate is increasing over time.  If p is less than 1 the hazard rate is decreasing over 
time.  As can be seen if p is equal to 1 this leads to the exponential model where the 
hazard rate is constant over time.
Another distributional assumption which may be appropriate is the Gompertz 
distribution.  If the underlying hazard is assumed to follow a Gompertz distribution the 
resulting survival function is of the following form.
S(t) = exp[(h/r)(1-ert)]
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Under this assumption the hazard rate will either increase or decrease at an exponential 
rate depending on the value of the estimated parameter r.  These three distributional 
assumptions can be used to estimate a hazard rate which is constant over time, increasing 
over time, and increasing exponentially over time.  These three models are estimated 
using maximum likelihood and the results are presented in the next section.
An alternative approach to these parametric models is to estimate a Cox 
proportional hazards model.  In order to estimate this model the ratio of hazards for two 
observations is taken as follows.  
hi(t)/hj(t) = h0(t)exp(B0 + B1Xi1 + … + BnXin) / h0(t)exp(B0 + B1Xj1 + … + BnXjn)
hi(t)/hj(t) = exp(B0 + B1Xi1 + … + BnXin) / exp(B0 + B1Xj1 + … + BnXjn)
Due to the fact that the baseline hazards are independent of the covariates the baseline 
hazards cancel leaving a hazard ratio which is independent of time.  Despite the fact that 
the underlying hazard function is not defined the model can still be estimated by the 
method of partial likelihood.  This method is presented by Cox in the 1972 paper in 
which he first introduces the Cox model.  While these models are not as efficient as a 
correctly specified parametric model they do not depend on distributional assumptions.  
This avoids the risk of obtaining misleading results due to an incorrectly specified 
parametric model.  A Cox proportional hazards model is estimated in addition to the three 
parametric models and the results are presented in the following section.
Estimation Results
The data on Major League Baseball managers from 1986 to 2005 consist of 573 
observations for which the individuals managed more than 5 consecutive games.  These 
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observations are used to construct managerial streaks which range in duration from less 
than one season to 16 seasons.  In order to avoid any left censoring issues only streaks 
which began from 1986 on are included in the analysis.  This results in a sample of 180 
managerial streaks.  Minority managers account for 24 of these streaks which are 
distributed between 16 different teams.  Using the performance and personal 
characteristic variables as covariates the four survival time models previously discussed 
are estimated.  These models are estimated for numerous different combinations of 
covariates in order to determine which variables have a statistically significant effect on 
survival time.  The estimation results with all variables included are presented below.
Estimation Results With All Variables Included
Exponential Weibull Gompertz Cox Prop. Hazards
Hazard 
Ratio
P-Value
Hazard Ratio
P-Value
Hazard 
Ratio
P-Value
Hazard 
Ratio
P-Value
Minority 0.7069960 0.166 0.5330281 0.014 0.5996457 0.046 0.6385576 0.078
Efficiency 0.0795495 0.007 0.0536909 0.002 0.0468547 0.002 0.0731800 0.006
Winning % 0.9998889 0.945 1.000437 0.791 1.000668 0.687 1.000088 0.957
Playoff Wins 0.9629778 0.404 0.9597056 0.368 0.9678998 0.472 0.9622753 0.399
Experience 0.9999485 0.877 0.9985763 0.000 0.9994366 0.104 0.9995162 0.192
Experience2 0.9999999 0.499 1.000000 0.115 0.9999999 0.569 1.000000 0.854
Age 1.033812 0.788 0.9786913 0.867 1.000140 0.999 1.035281 0.780
Age2 1.000021 0.986 1.000730 0.549 1.000473 0.694 1.000043 0.971
p - 1.898794 - -
r - - 0.18272 -
Under all but one model specification the coefficients on age squared and 
experience squared are statistically insignificant at any conventional level.  Additionally, 
for most model specifications the squared terms have the same sign as experience and 
age.  Therefore, it is concluded that age and experience do not have diminishing effects 
and the squared terms are dropped from the final model.  
Winning percentage does have the anticipated positive effect on survival under all 
specifications.  However, this effect becomes highly insignificant when technical 
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efficiency is added to the model.  Without technical efficiency the coefficient on winning 
percentage has a p-value of less than .001.  When technical efficiency is added to the
model, this p-value jumps to over .6 for all of the model specifications.  This implies that 
winning percentage does not provide any additional information to the model when 
technical efficiency is included.  .  
Similarly, playoff wins have the anticipated positive effect on survival.  However, 
for most specifications this effect is not significant at conventional levels.  As with 
winning percentage, for all specifications playoff wins become highly insignificant when 
technical efficiency is included in the model.
Winning percentage and playoff wins are both correlated with managerial 
efficiency with correlation coefficients of .75 and .27 respectively.  This correlation may 
be contributing to their insignificance when efficiency is included in the model.  
However, the inclusion or exclusion of these variables does not significantly change the 
magnitude or significance of the coefficient on the variable of interest, minority status.  
Therefore, winning percentage and post season wins are excluded from the final model 
chosen.
The exponential, Weibell, Gompertz, and Cox proportional hazards models are 
estimated with technical efficiency, age, experience, and minority status as covariates.  
The resulting hazard ratios and p-values are presented below.  A hazard ratio greater than 
1 implies that that covariate has a positive impact on the baseline hazard rate.  A hazard 
ratio of less than 1 implies that that covariate has a negative impact on the baseline 
hazard rate.
Estimation Results for the Selected Model
Exponential Weibull Gompertz Cox Prop. Hazards
Hazard P-Value Hazard P-Value Hazard P-Value Hazard P-Value
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Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio
Minority 0.71391 0.176 0.52267 0.011 0.60326 0.047 0.63369 0.072
Efficiency 0.07379 0.000 0.06400 0.000 0.06786 0.000 0.07293 0.000
Experience 0.99972 0.031 0.99908 0.000 0.99926 0.000 0.99956 0.006
Age 1.03797 0.007 1.05566 0.000 1.05202 0.000 1.04072 0.005
p - 1.830658 - -
r - - 0.181839 -
As can be seen in the regression results all of the covariates are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level with the exception of minority status for the exponential 
and Cox models where it is significant at the 18 and 8 percent levels respectively.  The 
results are also similar in sign and magnitude for all four models.  Minority status, 
efficiency, and experience all appear to increase the probability of survival while age has 
a negative effect on the probability of survival.  
In order to evaluate which model is most appropriate the survival functions for all 
four models are plotted along with the Kaplan-Meier survival function.  The Kaplan-
Meier survival function is a description of the observed survival rates which treats 
observations for which no failure is ever observed as having survived in the last period
they are observed.  However, it does not include these observations in the number of 
observations which are subject to failure in the next period.  The survival probabilities for 
each period are then used to calculate the probability of survival past a given period as a 
compound conditional probability.  This survival function can be interpreted as the 
observed survival function against which models should be compared.
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Clearly the Cox proportional hazards model does the best job of approximating 
the Kaplan Meier survival function.  Under this model all covariates are significant at the 
1 percent level except for minority status which is significant at the 8 percent level.  
Specification Tests
While the advantage of the Cox model is that it does not rely on distributional 
assumptions about the survival function, the assumption of proportional hazards must be 
tested before the Cox model is accepted as appropriate.  One test of this assumption is to 
estimate the model with interaction terms of time and each covariate included in the 
model.  If any of these interaction terms are statistically significant it is evidence that they 
violate the assumption of proportional hazards.  
Cox Prop. Hazards
Hazard Ratio P-Value
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Minority 0.49310 0.169
Efficiency 0.13248 0.008
Experience 0.99971 0.297
Age 1.04297 0.090
t*Minority 1.06696 0.634
t*Efficiency 0.78124 0.362
t*Experience 0.99996 0.573
t*Age 0.99864 0.853
The p-values on all four interaction terms are greater than .3.  This does not 
provide any evidence against the assumption of proportional hazards.  Another test of 
whether the assumption of proportional hazards is violated is to run a generalized linear 
regression of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals on time.  As with the previous test a 
significant coefficient on time for any of the covariates is evidence that the proportional 
hazards assumption is violated.  Graphically, this is equivalent to having slopes equal to 
zero in the graphs of these regressions.
Test of proportional hazards assumption
rho P-Value
Minority 0.04675 0.562
Efficiency -0.05657 0.591
Experience -0.08468 0.290
Age 0.00909 0.914
Global Test - 0.677
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The coefficient on time is highly insignificant for all covariates individually and 
jointly.  This result is consistent with the lack of slope in the graphs of the residuals 
versus time.  Therefore, there is no evidence that the proportionality assumption is 
violated and the Cox proportional hazards model is appropriate.
 Given the observed statistically significant relationship between minority status 
and survival, it is also possible that the covariates affect minorities differently than white 
managers.  In order to test this hypothesis, interaction terms of minority status with 
efficiency, experience, and age are added to the models previously estimated.  It is found 
that the coefficients on these interaction terms are insignificant at conventional levels for 
all model specifications.  Therefore, it is concluded that the covariates do not affect 
minorities differently and the previously estimated model is appropriate.
      
26
Conclusions
The model selected is a Cox proportional hazards model with minority status, 
efficiency, experience, and age as covariates.  In this model managerial efficiency 
increases the likelihood of survival as expected and is significant at a confidence level of 
less than 1 percent.  It is interesting to note that winning percentage and playoff wins are
highly insignificant when added to the model.  This implies that it is not important how 
many games a manager wins but rather how well he converts his given resources into 
wins.  This makes sense as owners of teams are expected to maximize profits not wins.  
Therefore, they will retain a manager with low wins if that manager did the best possible 
with his given resources.
Experience also increases the probability of a manager returning the following 
season.  This is to be expected as experience managing will add knowledge to a manager 
increasing his human capital.  The more human capital a manager possesses the less 
likely it is that someone more qualified can be found to replace him.  Unlike experience, 
age decreases the probability that a manager will return the next season.  This is not 
surprising as older managers are more likely to retire.  It is also likely that older managers 
will be unable to relate to players who are significantly younger.  The added experience 
from age is also likely captured by the experience term resulting in an overall negative 
relationship between age and the probability of returning.
The chosen model estimates a positive relationship between minority status and 
survival.  This impact is significant at the 8 percent level.  To see the impact of minority 
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status on managerial retention the estimated survival function is plotted with minority 
equal to zero and one.  The other covariates are evaluated at their sample mean.  
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Marginal Effect of Being a Minority 
on the Probability of Retention
Year of Tenure Marginal Effect
1 0.068
2 0.076
3 0.130
4 0.117
5 0.096
6 0.111
7 0.114
8 0.042
9 0.053
10 0.159
As can be seen in the preceding graph and table, being a minority increases the 
probability of returning the next season.  On average during the first ten seasons of tenure 
minority status increases the probability of retention by 9.6 percentage points. This effect 
is substantial and statistically significant with a p-value of .072.  The positive relationship 
between minority status and survival also appears to be robust to different model 
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specifications and combinations of variables.  This result leads to the conclusion that 
minority status does not decrease the probability of a manager returning.  Rather, there is 
significant evidence that minority status actually increases the probability of retention.  
Therefore, the current decrease in the number of minority managers is not due to 
discrimination in the retention decision.
While the analysis presented here finds no discrimination in the decision to keep a 
current manager, the results may be motivated by discrimination in hiring.  If there is 
discrimination against minorities in the hiring of major league managers, then only the 
most highly qualified minorities will become managers.  Therefore, the minority 
managers who have the possibility of not returning may possess some unobserved 
characteristic which enabled them to overcome the discrimination in hiring.  It is likely 
that this unobserved characteristic may also make the manager less likely to be fired and 
thus cause the relationship observed in this analysis.  However, this analysis attempts to 
account for all of the managers’ characteristics by controlling for performance, 
experience, and age.  After justifying the included variables and the appropriateness of 
the model this analysis concludes that the relatively low number of minority managers in 
the major leagues is not due to a lower probability of survival.
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